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EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
A.  General 
Risk  spreading  Is  a  golden  rule  of  financial  activity  In  general.  It  is 
the  prime  responslbl llty of  the  supervisory authorities  to ensure  that  this 
rule  Is  closely  observed  by  credit  Institutions.  In  the  area  of  credit 
risks.  too  great  a  concentration  of  exposures  to  any  one  party  could 
jeopardize  the  Independence  of  the  credit  Institution's management  and.  in 
the  event  of. that  party  fall lng.  could  cause  It  such  a  loss  as  to  threaten 
its stabl I lty. 
This  Is  therefore  a  key  rule  of  supervision  which  should  be  harmonized  at 
Community  level.  Furthermore.  specific  mention  of  this  was  made  In  the 
Commission's  White  Paper  on  completing  the  Internal  market.  However.  there 
Is  a  second  reason  for  such  harmonization.  namely  the  need  to prevent  clear 
distortion  of  competition.  As  the  rules  governing  the  division  of  risks 
are  primarily  Intended  to  I lmit  the  assistance  which  a  credit  Institution 
may  grant  a  given  client.  another  Institution  would  have  a  competitive 
advantage  If  It  were  subject  to  less stringent  rules. - 3 -
In  line  with  the  objectives  set  out  in  the  White  Paper,  the  Commission 
adopted,  In  1986,  a  Recommendation  on  large  exposures1  In  order  to  prepare 
credit  Institutions and  Member  States gradually  for  the adoption of  binding 
standards.  A recital  In  that  Recommendation  specifically promised  a  later 
proposal  for  a  Directive.  The  approaching  Internal  market  dead! lne  and  the 
agreement  reached  by  the  national  supervisory  authorities  within  the 
Banking  Advisory  Committee  suggest  that  the  time  Is  ripe  for  a  proposal  for 
a  Directive  to be  adopted. 
The  attached  proposal  for  a  Directive  submitted  for  the  Commission's 
approval  contains  str lcter  standards  than  those  set  out  In  the 
Recommendation.  Mentioning  only  the  key  rules,  the  absolute  I lmit  on 
exposures  to  a  single  client  has  been  set  at  25%  of  the  lending  credit 
Institution's own  funds  (the  corresponding percentage  In  the Recommendation 
was  40%),  whl  le  the  threshold  at  which  an  exposure  Is  considered  to  be  a 
large  exposure  has  been  reduced  to  10%  of  the  lending. institution's  own 
funds  (from  15%  In  the  Recommendation). 
This  reinforcement  of  standards  Is  In  response  to  the  earnestly  expressed 
wishes  of  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee  and  Is  also  supported  in  a 
document  on  sound  practices  presented  by  the  Basle  Committee  on  banking 
supervision at  the  recent  world  conference of  bank  Inspectors  In  Frankfurt. 
Stricter  standards  can  only  reinforce  the  solidity  and  stability  of  the 
Community's  banking  system.  Furthermore,  a  limit  of  25%  of  the  lending 
institution's  own  funds  can  in  no  way  be  regarded  as  excessively  low, 
1  Commission  Recommendation  of 
controlling  large  exposures 
4 . 2 . 1987 •  p .  1  0 . 
22  December  1986  on  monItorIng  and 
of  credit  institutions,  OJ  No  L 33, - 4  -
since,  If a  client  to which  such  a  large  exposure  had  been  Incurred  were  to 
fall,  the  credit  Institution  could- lose  a  quarter  of  Its own  funds,  which 
Is  a  considerable  amount  and  should,  Ideally,  be  reduced  still  further. 
Moreover,  this  Is  a  ceiling,  and  credit  Institutions  should  discipline 
themselves  to  reach  or  near  that  ceiling  only  in  the  case  of  exposures  of 
impeccable  quality. 
Nevertheless,  the  significant  reduction  in  the  cell ing  compared  with  that 
in  the  Recommendation  may  pose  adjustment  problems  for  some  credit 
Institutions or,  In  a  more  structural  manner,  for  certain  banking  systems 
or  parts  of  banking  systems.  Furthermore,  assistance  already  granted  in 
excess  of  25%  of  own  funds  cannot  always  be  reduced  quickly  by  credit 
Institutions  which  are  contractually  bound  to  the  recipients  of· that 
assistance.  Accordingly,  the  attached  proposal  conta.ins  a  provision 
authorizing  the  competent  authorities  to  grant  credit  Institutions  a 
maximum  period of  five years  In which  to bring existing exposures  into  I lne 
with  the  I lmits  laid  down;  in  addition,  loans  of  longer  maturity  with 
contractually  binding  terms  for  the  lending  Institution,  may  be  held untl I 
maturity. 
B.  Comments  on  the Artlc·les 
Article 1:  Definitions 
The  definitions  In  this  Article  are  drawn  mainly  from  other  Community 
Directives  or  proposals  for  Directives  in  the  banking  sphere  and  their 
retention  is  Justified  in  the  interests of  consistency. 
However,  two  def 1  nIt  Ions  are  pecu II  ar  to  thIs  proposa 1  and  merIt  spec I a I 
comment. - 5  -
The  fIrst  of  these  Is  the  defInItIon  of  "exposures"  (I et  ter  h)  of  the 
definitions).  The  above-mentioned  Commission  Recommendation  defined 
exposures  as  any  fac Ill ty  granted,  whether  drawn  or  undrawn,  by  a  credIt 
Institution  to  a  client  or  group  of  connected  clients,  on  or  off  balance 
sheet,  and  Inc I  udes  those  commItments  and  contIngent  I  terns  deemed  to  be 
relevant  by  the  respective  competent  authorities  when  assessing  the 
identifiable  risks  of  that  ·Institution.  A  I 1st  of  exposures  was  set  out, 
for  guidance,  In  the Appendix  to  the  Recommendation. 
Since  then,  the  solvency  ratio Dlrectlve1  has  been  adopted,  which  contains 
a  detailed nomenclature of  risks.  By  referring  to  this nomenclature,  It  Is 
poss lb I  e  to  have  both  a  more  precIse  and  a  more  bIndIng  defInItion  of 
exposures.  It  should  be  emphasized,  however,  that  this  borrowing  from  the 
solvency  ratio  Directive  covers  only  the  risk  nomenclature  and  not  the 
welghtlngs  attributed  to  the  risks  In  the  Dlrectlv• according  to  the  party 
or  degree  of  risk  Involved  In  the  transaction.  These  welghtlngs  in 
Directive 89/647/EEC  were  not  designed  to measure  exposure  to an  Individual 
cl lent  but  Instead  to  set  up  a  general  solvency  requirement  to  cover  the 
credit  risk  of  credit  Institutions.  Given  the  fundamental  aim  underlying 
the  rules on  risk spreading  (to  limit  an  Institution's maximum  risk of  loss 
with  respect  to  a  given  client),  a  prudent  approach  must  take  account  of 
exposures  at  their  nominal  value,  without  any  weighting or  degree of  risk. 
1  Council  Directive  89/647/EEC  of  18  December  1989  on  a  solvency  ratio 
for  credit  Institutions,  OJ  No  L 386,  30.12.1989,  p.  14. - 6  -
It  will  be  noted  that  the  definition  of  exposures  also  Includes 
underwrItIng  commItments  for . the  Issue  of  secur-1 tIes.  The  amount  taken 
Into  account  Is  the  Institution's net  commitment,  subJect  to  deduction  of 
the  shares  transferred  to other  credit or  financial  Institutions. 
The  second  definition  peculiar  to  this  proposal  Is  that  of  a  "group  of. 
connected  clients"  (letter  m)  In  Article 1).  This  definition  Is  very:. 
similar  to  that  In  the  1986  Recommendation.  The  first  part  of  the 
definition refers  to  the  existence of  a  power  of  control  as  defined  In  the 
eleventh  Indent  In  Article 1.  The  second  part  refers  to  a  de  facto 
Interconnection resulting  from  certain  I Inks,  examples of which  are  set  out 
In  the  proposal  for·  guidance.  The  .competent  authori-ties  will  be 
respons·lble  for  examining  the  combinations  of  exposures  Incurred  by  credit 
lnst I tut Ions  on  the  bas Is  of  the  rules  transpos lng  thIs  defInItion  Into 
national  law  and  for  assessing  whether  those  combinations of  exposures  are 
ln,fact  consistent  with  the  letter  and  spirit of  the  Community  definition. 
In  order  to give  the  competent  authorities  the  necessary  flexlbll lty  In  an 
area  whIch  depends  more  on  economIc  appr  a I sa I  than  on  I eQa I  cr Iter  I a.  the 
proposa I  makes  It  c I ear  that  the  comb I ned  exposure  presumptIons  In  the 
definition  are  relative  presumptions  which  can  be  reversed  If  there  is 
proof _to  the  contrary. 
Article  2:  Scooe 
The  Directive  will  apply  to  credit  Institutions  which  have  obtained  the 
authorization  referred  to  In  Article 3  of  Directive 77/780/EE.C  of 
12  December  1977  (first  coordination  Dlrectlve),1  I.e.  all  the  credit 
Institutions  In  the  Community.  However,  Member  States  will  not  have  to 
apply  the Directive to: 
1  OJ  No  L  322,  17.12.1977,  p.  30';. - 7  -
Institutions  permanently  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  first 
coordination 
Institutions 
Member  State); 
Directive  (mainly  central 
and  certain  particular 
banks.  post  office 
Institutions  In 
gl ro 
each 
credIt  I  nst I tut Ions  permanent I  y  aff lllated  to  a  centra I  body  wh lch 
supervises  them  and  which  Is  established  In  the same  Member  State.  and 
provided  that  the  conditions  set  out  In  Article 2(4)(a)  of 
Directive 77/780/EEC  are  met.  In  that  case.  without  prejudice  to  the 
application  of  the  Directive  to  the  central  body.  the 
whole- constituted  by  the  central  body  and  Its  affl I lated 
Institutions- must  be  the  subject  of  global  supervision  with  regard 
to  large exposures. 
Article  3:  RePorting of  large exposures 
Effective  supervision  of  large  exposures  clearly  calls  for  such  exposures 
to  be  notified  regularly  to  the  competent  authorities.  Such  Is  the  aim  of 
Article 3. 
Paragraph  1  of  Article 3  stipulates  that  large  exposures  must  be  reported 
to  the  competent  authorities.  At  their  discretion.  Member  States  wi  11 
provIde  for  thIs  report lng  to  be  carr led  out  by  one  of  the  fo I low lng 
methods: 
notification of at I  large exposures  at  least once  a  year.  ~acked up  by 
communI cat ton  durIng  the  year  of  any  mod If I  cat Ions  to·  the  annua I 
notification; 
notification of alI  large exposures at  least  four  times  a  year. (2) 
- 8  -
The  first of  these  two  methods,  which  did  not  appear  In  the Recommendation. 
was  suggested  to  the Commission  by  the Banking  Advisory  Committee. 
As  to  the  second  method,  the  minimum  frequency  of  notification  has  been 
Increased  to  four  t lmes  a  year  from  the  single, report  provided  for  In  the 
Recommendation.  Effective  monitoring  of  large  exposures  presupposes  that 
sufficiently  frequent  Information  reaches  the  supervisory  authorities. 
Moreover,  one  of  the  recitals  In  the  Recommendation  suggested  that  the 
I 
competent  authorities should  seek  more  frequent' reporting. 
Member  States will  have  the  choice  of  transposing  Into  national  taw  either 
one  of  these methods  only or  both  methods.  In  ~he  latter case,  they  wll I  be 
able  to decide whether  the  choice of method  should  be  left  to the competent 
' 
authorities or  to  the credit  Institution  Itself. 
Paragraph  2  of  Article 3  stipulates  that  an  exposure  to  a  client  or  group 
of  connected  clients  Is  to  be  considered  a  large  exposure  where  Its  value 
I  Is  equal  to  or  exceeds  10%  of  the  lending  irnstltution's  own  funds.  The 
corresponding  percentage  in  the  Recommendation  was  15%.  The  reduction  In 
this  threshold  is  justified  by  the  general  need  to  make  the  system  of 
I 
supervising  large  exposures  more  stringent  In  order  to  reinforce  the 
stability  of  the  Community's  banking  system.  More  specifically,  once  the 
eel I lng  on  Individual  exposures  has  Itself  been  cut  (see  Article 4(1) 
I  . 
I  below),  It  Is  logical  to  reduce  the  reporting  threshold.  Some  countries 
already  employ  a  10%  threshold,  and  the  Commission  considers,  in  the  I ight 
I  of  their  experience.  that  such  a  threshold  cannot  be  regarded  as  Imposing 
I  bureaucratic  obi lgatlons.  Since  the  propos~!  also  provides  for  an 
aggregate  I imit  on  large  exposures  of  800%  of  own  funds  (see  Article  4(3) 
below),  the  reporting  exercise  Is  limited  to~ theoretical  maximum  of  80 
exposures.  Moreover,  this reporting exercise can  easily be  computerized. - 9  -
The  reduction  In  the  threshold  to  10%  wl  II  ease  administrative obi lgatlons 
In  a  further  r aspect .  The  CommIssIon  has  not  ret  a I  ned ·paragraphs 3  and  4 
of  the  corresponding  Article  In  the  Recommendation,  which  provided  for  a 
credit  Institution's  ten  largest  exposures  to  be  reported,  whether  or  not 
these  were  "large  exposures" .. The  Banking  Advisory  Committee  agreed  that 
such  reporting  would  lose  much  of  Its. value as  a  result  of  the  widening  of 
the  concept  of  "large  ex.posure".  As  to  the  supervision  of  Institutions 
which  do  not  have  exposures  In  excess of  10%  of  their  own  funds,  this  Is, 
by  definition,  not  subject  to  legislation governing  the  spreading of  large 
exposures . 
.  Art lc le  4 
Paragraph  1 
This  key  provision  In  the  draft  Directive  stipulates  that  credit 
I  nst I tu  t Ions  may  not  Incur  an  exposure  to  a  c I I  ent  or  group  of  connected 
clients  where  Its  value  exceeds  25%  of  own  funds.  This  represents  .an 
appreciable  reduction  compared  with  the  Recommendation,  which  provided  for 
a  40%  ce Ill ng.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  Introduction  of  strIcter 
standards  more  than  four  years  after  the  adoption  of  the  Recommendation. 
which  was  only  an  Initial  stage,  Is  a  logical  step,  this  reinforcement  of 
the  standard  was  speclflcal IY  cal.led  for  by  a  significant  maJority  of  the 
Banking  Advisory  Committee,  subject  to  a  transitional  period  for  existing 
exposures  (see  Article 6  below).  Support  for  a  25%  ceiling  can  also  be 
found  In  a  document  presented by  the Basle Committee  on  banking  supervision 
at  the  world  conference  of  bank  Inspectors  held  In  Frankfurt  In 
October  1990. - 10  -
A  25%  ceiling  should  not  be  regarded  as  excessively  low  since,  while 
complying  with  that  limit,  a  credit  Institution  could  still,  under  the 
worst  hypothesis,  lose  a  quarter  of  Its own  funds.  This  Is  a  considerable 
amount  and  should,  Ideally,  be  reduced  further.  The  point  Is  that  this  Is 
a  maximum  ceiling  for  exposures  of.  Impeccable  quality,  and  credit 
Institutions  should  discipline  themselves  to  reach  or  approach  that  1 lmlt 
only  In  the  case of  exposures of such  quality.  •. 
ParagraPh  2 
Bank  supervisors  know  from  experience  that  there  Is  frequently  an  Increased 
risk  where  a  credit  Institution  lends  to  enterprl"ses ·linked  to  it.  The 
Banking  Advisory  Committee  speclflcal ly  requested  the Commission  to provide 
for  a  lower  limit  for  exposures  to  associated  enterprises  (parent 
undertaking of  the  credit  Institution and  other  subsidiaries of  that  parent 
undertaking).  It  had  Initially  been  planned  to  Incorporate  such  a 
provision  In  the  proposal  for  a  Directive  relating  to  the  supervision  of 
credit  Institutions  on  a  consolidated  basls.1  But,  as  Indicated  In  the 
fourth 'recital  of  that  proposal,  It  was  considered  preferable  to  settle 
this  question  In  a  more  systematic  manner  within  the  framework  of  the 
future  Directive on  large exposures. 
The  Commission  has  set  this  lower  limit  at  20%  (compared  with  the  normal 
25%  limit  laid down  In  paragraph  1). 
Provision  Is  made  for  exceptions  to  this  rule  In  paragraphs  5  and  6  (see 
below). 
1  COM(90)  451,  OJ  No  C 315,  14.12-:1990,  p.  15. - 11  -
Paragraph  3 
The  Commission  has  retained  the aggregate  I lmlt  on  large exposures  provided 
for  In  the  Recommendation,  I.e.  800%  of  own  funds.  However,  as  the  concept 
of  "large exposure"  has  been  broadened  (see Article 3(2)  above),  this  I lmlt 
has  now  become,  Indirectly,  more  strict. 
An  aggregate  limit  Is  a  valuable complement  to  the  I Imitation of  Individual 
risks  In  legislation  governing  large  exposures.  While  the  limitation  of 
Individual  risks ensures  that  no  exposure exceeds  the  cell lng  laid down,  It 
does  not  affect  the  spread of  risks  throughout  the  portfol lo.  An  aggregate 
limit  of  800%,  however,  will  mean  that  a  credit  Institution  can  at  most 
have  80  I  arge  exposures  and  a  max I  mum  of  32  exposures  whIch  reach  the 
Individual  eel I lng  of  25%  of own  funds. 
ParagraPh  4 
This  paragraph  provides  that  Member  States may  Impose  more  stringent  limits 
than  those  laid  down  In  paragraphs  1,  2  and  3. 
Paragraph  5 
This  pa·ragraph  requires  the  limits  laid  down  In  the  first  three  paragraphs 
to  be  observed  at  alI  times.  If  those  I lmlts  were  to  be  exceeded- which 
could  happen  accidentally- the  proposal  stipulates  that  they  may  be 
exceeded  only  In  exceptional  and  temporary  circumstances  and,  In  such 
cases,  the  competent  authorities would  have  to  fix  a  deadl lne  within  which 
the credit  Institution would  be  obi lged  to  regularize  Its situation. 
ParagraPh  6 
This  paragraph  permits  Member  States.to exempt  fully  or  partially  from  the 
need  to  observe  the  special  20%  limit  laid  down  In  paragraph  2  exposures 
Incurred  by  the  credit  Institution  to  a  financial  holding  company  which  Is - 12  -
Its  parent  undertaking  and  to  other  subsidiaries of  that  financial  holding 
company  which  are  credit  Institutions,  financial 
undertakings  providing ancillary banking  services. 
The  presumption  of  Increased  risk  underlying  the 
applicable  to  exposures  to  associated  undertakings 
lnst I tut Ions  or 
special  20%  I lmlt 
Is  not  necessarl ly 
relevant  In  the  case of  exposures  to  banking  and  financial  entitles  In  the 
group.  In  that  event,  however,  the group  should structure  Itself  In  such  a 
way  that  those entlt1es can  be  the  subject of  su~ervlslon on  a  consolidated 
basis exercised  In  accordance  with .the  future  Directive  In  this  field  (see 
the  reference  above  to  the  proposal  for  a  Directive  presented  by  the 
CommIssIon). 
Paragraoh  7 
This  paragraph  permits Member  States  to exempt  fully  or  partially  from  all 
the  I lmlts  laid  down  In  paragraphs  1,  2  and  3  (but  not  from  the  reporting 
obi lgatlons  set  out  In  Article 3)  exposures  Incurred  by  the  credit 
Institution to: 
Its  parent  undertaking,  provided  that  that  undertaking  Is  Itself  a 
credit  Institution.  It  does  not  seem  Justified  to  limit  the  flow  of· 
funds  whIch  a  subsIdIary  can  provIde  for  Its  parent  credIt 
Institution.  Of  course,  the  proviso  here  Is  again  that  the  parent 
undertaking  Is  subject  either  to  supervlsl6n  on  a  consolidated  basis 
exercised  In  accordance  with  the  Community  Directive  In  question  or, 
If  It  Is  located  In  a  third country,  to equivalent  supervision; 
subsidiaries,  provided  that  those  subsidiaries  are  credit 
Institutions,  financial  Institutions  or  undertakings  providing 
ancl I lary  banking  services.  Since  these  are  activities  which  the 
~·l!  ~. •'. !  ••  ~·-
·,(;.~--;--~-- .. "':  ~. 'if• 
..  ~ 
'". 
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credit  Institution  could  carry  out  directly,  there  Is  no  reason  to 
limit  the  funding  which  It  provides  for  Its subsidiaries.  Once  again, 
the  exemption  Is  subject  to  the  proviso  that  the  subsidiaries  In 
question  are  Included  In  the  consolidated  supervision  of  the  parent 
undertaking. 
ParagraPh  8 
ThIs  paragraph  authorIzes  Member  States  to  exempt  a  number  of  specIfIc 
exposures  fully  or  partially  from  the  application  of  the  limits  laid  down 
In  paragraphs  1,  2 and  3. 
The  first  six  Indents  (letters a)  to  f))  cover  exposures  Incurred  directly 
or  Indirectly  to  Zone  A central  governments  and  central  banks  and  to  the 
European  Communities.  No  Member  State  Imposes  or  seems  prepared  to  Impose 
limits  on  exposures  Incurred  by  Its  credit  Institutions  to  Itself.  Given 
the  rule  of  non-discrimination  within  the  Community,  this  lack  of 
I Imitation  should  In  any  case  apply  to  exposures  Incurred  to  other 
Member  States.  But,  for  reasons  similar  to  those  given  In  connection  with 
the above-mentioned  Directive 89/647/EEC  or  the  proposal  for  a  Directive on 
capital  adequacy  of  Investment  firms  and  credit  lnstltutlons,1  It  seems 
pertinent  to  refer  to  a  wider  geographical  area,  namely  Zone  A as  defined 
In  Directive 89/647/EEC. 
Letters  g)  and  h)  cover  cases where  the  risk  can  be  considered  to  be  small 
or  even  nil,  I.e.  where  It  Is  covered  by  a  guarantee  lri  the  form  of  cash 
deposits or  certificates of deposit  lodged  with  the  lending  Institution. 
Letter  I)  covers  claims  with  a  maturity of  up  to  one  year  on  other  credit 
Institutions.  The  aim  here  Is  to  cover  transactions  on  the  Interbank 
market.  This  Is  a  market  which  operates  between  professionals  who  know 
each  other  and  which  requires  some  flexlbl llty  In  order  to  function 
harmoniously.  The  Commission  does  not  therefore  consider  It  appropriate, 
1  COM(90)  141;  OJ  No  C 152,  21.6.1990,  p.  6. - 14  -
at  this  stage,  to  establish· a  single  harmonized  llnirt  at  Community  level 
for  exposures  Incurred on  this market. 
The  same  reasoning  applies  to  letter  J),  which  concerns  commercial  paper 
meeting  certain  conditions,  and  to  letter  k),  which  concerns  the 
obligations  defined  In  article  22  paragraph  4  of  directive  85/611/EEC  on 
UCITS1. 
Letter  I)  covers  cooperative  banks  or  savings  banks  belonging  to  a  network 
and  for  which  there  Is  a  centralized cash  clearing operation. 
ParagraPh  9 
Paragraph  9  refers to exposures  Incurred directly or  Indirectly  to  regional 
and  local  authorities  In  the  Member  States.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
degree  of  risk  Involved  here  Is  normally  lower,  the  proposal  permits  a  20% 
weighting  to  be  applied.  This  rate  may  be  reduced  to  0%  subject  to  the 
conditions  tald  down  In  Article 7  of  Directive  89/647/EEC.  Given  t~e wide 
differences  which  may  exist  between  the  rules·governing  ~eglonal  and  local 
authorIties  outs I  de  the  CommunIty,  the  CommIssion  does  not  consIder  it 
appropriate  to extend  this arrangement  to  the  whole  of  Zone  A. 
Paragraph  10 
This  paragraph  states,  as  a  general  principle,  that  where  an  exposure  to  a 
client  Is  guaranteed,  to  the  satisfaction of  the  competent  authorities,  by 
a  third party,  the  competent  authorities may  deem  the exposure  to have  been 
Incurred  to  that  thIrd  party  and  not  to  the  c I lent.  Thus,  where,  for 
example,  a  credit  Institution  Incurs  an  exposure  of  50  to cl lent  A and  one 
of  20  to  client B,  but  with  cl lent  B  guaranteeing  10  of  A's  debt  to  the 
credit  Institution,  the exposure  to A and  B may  be  deemed  to be  as  follows: 
- A:  40 
- B:  30. 
1  OJ  No  L 375,  31 . 12. 1985,  p.  3.  ·  ... - 15  -
Article 5:  Supervision on  a  consolidated or  non-consol ldated  basis 
This  Article  Includes  provisions  already  adopted  as  part  of 
Directive 89/647/EEC  on  a  solvency  ratio,  and  In  particular Article 3(2)  to 
(6)  of  that  Directive. 
Paragraph  1  covers  the  case  of  a  credit  Institution  which  Is  neither  a 
parent  undertaking nor  a  subsidiary. 
Paragraph  2  establishes  the  principle  of  applying  the  rules  set  out  In 
Articles 3  and  4 on  a  consolidated basis. 
Paragraph  3  lays  down  the  arrangements  for  the non-consolidated  supervision 
of  a  parent credit  Institution and  Its subsidiaries establ lshed  In  the  same 
Member  State. 
Paragraph  4  concerns  the  supervision,  on  a  non-consol !dated  basis,  of 
subsidiaries establ !shed  In  other  Member  States. 
Paragraph  5  provides  for  possible  bilateral  agreements  under  which  the 
competent  authorities  In  the Member  State  In  which  a  subsidiary  Is  situated 
could  delegate  their  responslbll lty  for  supervision  to  the  cpmpetent 
authorities  In  the  Member  State  In  which  the  parent  credit  undertaking  Is 
estab I I  shed. 
Artl~le 6:  Transitional  provisions  relating  to  exposures  In  excess of  the 
limits 
Article  6  concerns  exposures  existing  at  the  time  the  Directive  Is 
published  In  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  which  exceed 
the  limits  laid  down  by  the  Directive.  It  would  seem  Justified  to  make 
transitional  arrangements  for  this  type  of  exposure,  In  order  to  allow 
credit  Institutions  the  time  to  find  a  solution  which  would  not  overturn 
their  commercial  relationship  with  their  clients.  In  any  event,  credit (3) 
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Institutions  may  be  bound- wl~h  regard  to  the  parties  to  whom  those 
exposures  have  been  Incur red - by  cont r actua I  arrangements  wh I  ch  do  not 
necessarily  permit  them  to reduce  such  exposures quickly. 
Paragraph  1  specifies  that  risks  entered  Into  force  b~ifore  the  date  of 
publ lcatlon  of  the  directive  In  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European 
Community  shall  be  eligible  for  the  grandfatherlng  provisions.  The  choice 
of  this  cut-off  point  Is  justified  by  the  consideration  that  from  the 
moment  when  the  directive  Is  published.  credit  Institutions  should  not  be 
able  to  take exposures  exceeding  the  limits that will  apply  subsequently. 
This  paragraph  also stipulates  that  the  competent  authorities  must  require 
the  credit  Institution  In  question  to  take  the  steps  necessary  to  have  the 
excess  exposure  or  exposures  brought  Into  I lne  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Directive. 
Paragraph  2  provides  for  the  process of  reducing  the excess exposures  to be 
Implemented  and  completed  within  the  period  deemed  by  the  competent 
authorities to be  consistent with  the  principle of  sound  administration and 
fair  ·competition.  The  competent  authorities  are  required  to  Inform  the 
Comml ss Jon  and  the  BankIng  AdvIsory  Comml ttee  of  the  schedule  for  the 
general  process  adopted. 
In  accordance  wl th  paragraph  4.  however.  the  per lod  In  quest Jon  may  not 
exceed  five years  from  the  date  stipulated  In  Article 8(1).  I.e. 
1  January  1993.  However  loans  with  a  longer  maturity  with  binding 
contractual  terms  for  the credit  Institution may  be  held untl I maturity. 
Paragraph  3  stipulates that.  credit  Institution  may  only  take  advantage  of 
the  period specified  In  paragraph  2  to  the extent  that  It  does  not  take  any 
measure  which  would  cause  the  exposures  to exceed  the  level  existing at  the 
date  of  publication of  the  directive  In  the Official  Journal.  The  emphasis 
Is  therefore on  the deliberate action of  the credit  Institution. - 17  -
Finally,  paragraph  5  contains  a  specific  provision  which  Member  States  may 
apply  to  the  particular  categories  of  credit  Institution  referred  to  In 
Article 4(2)  of  Directive 89/646/EEC.  This  provision  Is  justified  by  the 
fact  that,  as  the  own  funds  of  such  Institutions  are  limited,  Immediate 
appl lcatlon  of  the  25%  rule  would  reduce  their  lending  activity  too 
abruptly.  The  arrangements  set  out  In  paragraph  5  can  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
from  1  January  1993  to  31  December  1997,  the  Institutions  In  question 
may  be  subjected  to  a  I lmlt  of  40%  Instead of  the  25%  limit  laid  down 
In  Article 4(1);  In  that  event,  all  new  exposures  Incurred  by  such 
Institutions are  to be  subject  to  that  40%  I lmlt; 
exposures  existing  on  the  date  the  Directive  Is  published  In  the 
Official  Journal  may  be  maintained,  whatever  their  level,  until 
31  December  1997,  subject  to  the  sole  proviso  that  they  may  not  be 
Increased beyond  the  level  reached  on  the  date of  publ lcatlon; 
as  from  1  January1998,  the  25%  limit  will  come  Into  force  and  will 
apply  to all  new  exposures; 
however,  exposures  between  25%  and  40%  of  own  funds  existing  at  the 
end  of  t~e  maximum  period  of  five  years  (i.e.  in  principle  on 
31  December  1997)  may  be  maintained  for  a  maximum  period  of 
three years  (I.e.  unt I I  31  December  2000),  subject  to  the  same 
condition  that  they  may  not  be  Increased; 
as  from  1  January  1998,  therefore,  no  exposure  In  excess of  40%  of  own 
funds  may  be  maintained,  and,  as  from  1  January  2001,  no  exposure  In 
excess of  25%  of own  funds  may  be  maintained; 
paragraph  4  provides,  however,  that  loans  with  a  longer  maturity  than 
the  dates  referred  to above  and  with  binding  contractual  terms  for  the 
lending  credit  institution  may  in  alI  cases  be  maintained  untl I 
maturity. - 18  -
Article 7:  Subsequent  amendments 
Paragraph  1  specifies  the  fields  In  which  the  procedure  for  making 
technical  amendments  to  the  Directive  are  to  apply.  The  first  three 
Indents  concern  the  adaptation  of  definitions  or  terminology.  The  fourth 
relates  to  the  frequency  of  large  exposure  reporting  ((Article 3(1)).  The 
fifth  Indent  concerns  the  clarification  or  extension  of  the  exemptions 
provided  for  In  Article 4(5)  to  (9).  The  sixth  Indent,  finally,  refers  to 
the  max lmum  per lod  for  reducing  the  excess  exposures  outstanding  at  the 
time  of  the  publication  of  the  Directive  lri  the  Official  Journal  of  the 
European  Communities.  This  maximum  period  laid  down  In  Article 6(4)  is 
five  years. 
The  procedure  laid  down  In  paragraph  2  Is-Procedure  Ill,  Variant  (a),  In 
Councl I  Decision  87/373/EEC  of  13  July  1987  laying  down  the  procedures  for 
the exercise of  Implementing  powers  conferred on  the Commission. 
Article 8:  Flnal·orovlslons 
The  first  subparagraph of  paragraph  1  requires Member  States to comply  with 
the Directive by  1  January  1993. 
The  second  subparagraph  stipulates  that,  when  Member  States  adopt  the 
necessary  provisions  of  national  law,  these  must  contain  a  reference  to 
this  Directive  or  must  be  accompanied  by  such  reference  when  they  are 
officiallY publ lshed. 
Paragraph  2  deals  with· the  transmission  to  the  Commission  of  the  main 
provisions of  national  law  adopted  by  the Member  States. 
Article 9 
This Article contains  the usual  wording  to  the effect  that  the Directive  is  ...  ~~-· 
{  ·  .......  -.  addressed  to all  Member  States. 
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Proposal  for  a 
COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE 
on  monitoring  and  control I lng  large exposures 
of credit  Institutions 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community, 
and  In  particular  the  first  and  third sentences of Article 57(2)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  proposal  from  the Commlsslon1, 
In  cooperation with  the  European  Pari lament2, 
Having  regard  to  the opinion of  the  Economic  and  Social  Commlttee3, 
Whereas  this  Directive  Is  consistent  with  the  alms  set  out  In  the 
Commission's  White  Paper  on  completing  the  Internal  marlce.t4; 
Whereas  the  suitable  approach  Is  to  achieve  harmonization  of  essential 
supervisory  rules;  whereas  Member  States should  have  the option of  adopting 
more  stringent provisions  than  those  provided ·for  by  this Directive; 
Whereas  this  Directive  has  been  the  subject  of  consultation  with  the 
Banking  Advisory  Committee,  which  Is  responsible,  under  Article 6(4)  of 
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laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  relating  to  the  taking-up 
and  pursuit  of  the  business  of  credit  lnstltutions1,  as  last  amended  by 
Directive  89/646/EEc2,  for  making  suggestions  to .the  Commission  with  a 
view  to coordinating  the coefficients applicable  In  the Member  States; 
Whereas  monitoring  and  control ling the  exposures of  a  credit  institution  is 
an  Integral  part of  prudential  supervision;  whereas  excessive concentration 
of  exposures  to a  single cl lent or  group  of  connected clients may  result  in 
an  unacceptable  risk;  whereas  such  a  situation  may  be  deemed  to  be 
prejudicial  to  the  solvency of  a  credit  Institution; 
Whereas  common  guldel lnes  for  monitoring  and  control I lng  exposures  of 
credit  Institutions  were  Introduced  Initially  by  Commission  Recommendation 
87/62/EEC3;  whereas  that  Instrument  was  chosen  since  It  permitted  existing 
systems  to  be  adjusted  gradually  and  new  systems  to  be  established without 
causing  dislocation  to  the  banking  system  of  the  Community;  whereas,  with 
that  first  phase  now  over,  It  Is  necessary  for  a  binding  Instrument  to  be 
adopted,  appl !cable  to alI  Community  credit  Institutions; 
Whereas  credit  Institutions  In  a  unified  banking  market  engage  In  direct 
competition  with  each  other  and  the  prudential  supervision  requirements 
throughout  the Community  should,  therefore,  be  equivalent;  whereas,  to  that 
end,  the  criteria  applied  for  determining  -the  concentration  of  exposures 
should  be  the  subject  of  legally  binding  rules  at  Community  level  and 
cannot  be  left entirely to  the discretion of  the Member  States;  whereas  the 
adopt ion  of  common  rules  wi  II  therefore  best  serve  the  Interests  of  the 
Community,  since  It  will  prevent  differences  In  competitive  conditions, 
whl le  at  the  same  time  strengthening  the Community's  banking  system; 
1  OJ  No  L 
2  OJ  No  L 
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Whereas  as  regards  the. precise  accounting  technique  to  be  used  for 
assessing  exposures,  reference  Is  made  to  the  provisions  of  Councl I 
Directive 86/635/EEC  of  8  December  1986  on  the  ann~al  accounts  and 
consolidated accounts of  banks  and  other  financial  lnstltutlons1; 
Whereas  Counc I I  DIrectIve  89/647  /EEC  of  18  December  1989  on  a  so I  vency 
ratio  for  credit  lnstltutlons2  contains  a  list  of  credit  rlslcs  which  may 
be  Incurred  by  credit  lnstltufions;  whereas  It  Is  therefore  justified  to 
refer  to  that  list  In  the  definition  of  exposure  for  the  purpose  of  this 
Directive;  whereas  It  Is  not,  however,  appropriate  to  refer  to  the 
welghtlngs  or  degrees  of  risk  set  out  by  Directive  89/647/EEC;  whereas 
these welghtlngs and  degrees of  risk have  been  devised  In  order  to set  up  a 
genera I  so I  vency  requIrement  to  cover  the  credIt  rIsk  of  credIt 
Institutions;  whereas  In  the  framework  of  regulating  large  exposures,  the 
purpose  Is  to  limit  the  maximum  potential  loss  that  a  credit  Institution 
may  Incur  through  a  single client or  a  group  of  related clients; whereas  It 
Is  therefore  appropriate  to  adopt  a  prudent  approach  consisting  of  talclng 
account  of  the  nom Ina I  value  of  exposures.  wl thout  app II cat I  on  of  any 
welghtlngs or  degree of  risk; 
Whereas  when  a  credit  Institution  has  an  exposure  to  Its  own  parent 
undertaking.  or  to other  subsidiaries of  Its parent  undertaking,  particular 
prudence  Is  just If led;  whereas  the  management  of  exposures  Incurred  by 
credit  Institutions must  be  carried out  In  a  fully  autonomous  manner,  with 
respect  to  the  principles  of  sound  banking  management,  without  regard  to 
any  other  considerations beyond  these principles;  whereas  the  provisions of 
the  Second  Council  Directive  89/646/EEC  of  15  December  1989,  on  the 
coordination of  laws,  regulations  and  administrative provisions  relating to 
the  taking  up  and  pursuit  of  the  business  of  credit  Institutions  and 
amending  Directive  77/780/EEC,  require  that  where  the  Influence  exercised 
by  persons  holding  a  qual lfylng  participation  In  a  credit  Institution 
directly  or  Indirectly  Is  likely  to  operate  to  the  detriment  of 
1  OJ  No  L 372,  31.12.1986,  p.  1. 
2  OJ  No  L 386,  30.12.1989,  p.  14. 
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the  prudent  and  sound  management  of  the  Institution,  the  competent 
authorities  shall  take  appropriate  measures  to  put· an  end  to  that 
situation;  whereas  In  the  large  exposures  field,  It  Is  justified  to  Lnsert 
specific  rules with  respect  to  an  exposure  held  by  a  credit· institution on 
its  own  group,  and  In  such  cases  more  stringent  limitations  are  justified 
for  such  exposures  than  for  other  exposures;  whereas  this  more  stringent 
limitation  must  however  not  be  applied  when  the  parent  undertaking  is  a 
financial  holding  company  or  a  cr:edlt  institution,  and  the  other 
subsidiaries  which  are  either  credit  or  financial  Institutions,  or 
undertaking  offering  ancillary  banking  services,  to  the  extent  that  all 
these  undertakings  are  Included  in  the  supervision  on  a  consolidated  basis 
of  the  credit  institution;  whereas  In  that  ·case,  the  supervision  on  a 
consolidated  basis of  the  group  allows  sufficiently efficient  supervision, 
without  the  Imposition  of  more  stringent  I imits  on  exposure  being  needed; 
whereas  under  this  approach,  banking  groups  will  also  be  encouraged  to 
organize  their  structure  In  such  a  way  as  to make-consolidated  supervision 
possible,  which  is  a  desirable  result  because  it  allows  more  comprehensive 
supervision  to be  carried out; 
Whereas  it  is necessary  to provide  for  a  two-stage  application of  the  limit 
of  25%  of  own  funds  in  the  case  of  the  particular  categories  of  credit 
Institution  referred  to  In  Article 4(2)  of  Directive 89/646/EEC;. whereas, 
the  own  funds  of  such  Institutions·  being  limited,  a  single-stage 
application  of  the  25%  rule  would  reduce  their  lending  activity  too 
abruptly; 
Whereas  Implementing  powers  of  the  same  nature  as  those  which  the  Councl 1 
reserved  for  itself  In  Directive  89/299/EEC  of  17  April  1989  on  the  own 
funds  of  credit  instltutlons1  were  granted  to  the  Commission  In  Directive 
89/646/EEC; 
1  OJ  No  L 124,  5.5.1989,  p.  16. - 23  -
Whereas,  taking  account  of  the  specific  characteristics  of  the  sector  In 
question,  It  Is  appropriate  to  give  the  committee  provided  for  In  Article 
22  of  Directive 89/646/EEC  the  role of assisting the Commission  In  carrying 
out  the  responslbll ltles granted  to  It  according  to  the  rules of  procedure 
laid  down  In  Article 2,  Procedure  I II,  Variant  (a)  of  Council 
Decision 87/373/EEC  of  13  July  1987  laying  down  the  procedures  for  the 
exercise of  Implementing  powers  conferred on  the Commlsslon1, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECTIVE: 
1  OJ  NO  L 197 ,  18 . 7 . 1987 ,  p •  33 . - 24  -
Article 1 
Definitions 
For  the  purpose of  this Directive: 
(a)  "credit  Institution"  means  a  credit  Institution  as  defined  In  the 
first  Indent  of  Article 1  of  Directive 77/780/EEC  and  Includes 
branches  of  such  Institutions  In  third  countries  and  all  private  or 
publ lc  undertakings,  Including  their  branches,  which  satisfy  the 
definition  given  In  the  first  Indent  of.  Article 1  of 
Directive 77/780/EEC  and  which  have  been  authorized  In  a  third 
country; 
(b)  "competent  authorities"  means  the  competent  authorities as  defined  In 
'  ~' 
the  ninth  Indent  of  Article  1  of  Directive  (supervision  on  a 
consol !dated basis); 
(c)  "parent  undertaking"  means  a·  parent  undertaking  as  defined  In 
Articles 1  and  2 of  Council  Directive 83/349/EEC1; 
(d)  "subsidiary undertaking"  means  a  subsidiary  undertaking  as  defined  In 
Articles 1  and  2  of  Directive 83/349/EEC;  any  subsidiary  undertaking 
of  a  subsidiary  undertaking  shal I  be  deemed  to  be  a  subsidiary of  the 
parent  undertaking which  Is at  the  head  of  those undertakings; 
(e)  "financial  holding  company"  means  a  financial  holding  company  as 
defined  In  the third  indent  of Article  1 of Directive  ...  (supervision 
on  a  consolidated basis); 
1  OJ  No  L 193,  18.7.1983,  p.  1. - 25  -
(f)  "f Inane Ia I  lnst I tut I  on"- means  a  f Inane Ia I  lnst I tut ion  as  defIned  In 
the sixth  Indent  of Article 1 of Directive 89/646/EEC; 
(g)  "ancillary banking  services undertaking":  an  undertaking as  defined  In 
Article  1,  fifth  Indent,  of  Directive  •••••••••  (supervision  on  a 
consolidated basis); 
(h)  "exposures"  means:  the  assets  and  off-balance-sheet  Items  listed  In 
Art I  c I  e  6  of  DIrectIve 89/647  /EEC  and  In  Annexes  I  and  I I I  thereto. 
without  application  of  the  welghtlngs  or  degrees  of  risk  set  out  In 
those  provisions;  the  risks mentioned  In  Annex  Ill  must  be  calculated 
In  accordance  with  the·method  set  out  In  Annex  ll  to  that  Directive. 
without  application  of  the  welghtlngs  for  counterparty  risk;  the 
underwrItIng .  commItments  for  the  Issue  of  securItIes  are  Inc I  uded. 
subJect  to  deduct ion  of  the  shares  transferred  to  other  credIt  or 
financial  Institutions; 
(I)  "Zone  A"  means  the  zone  defined  In  the  second  Indent  of  Article 2  of 
Directive 89/647/EEC; 
(J)  "Zone  au  means  the  zone  defined  In  the  third  Indent  of  Article 2  of 
Directive 89/647/EEC; 
(k)  "own  funds"  means  the  own  funds  of  a  credit  Institution  within  the 
meaning  of Directive 89/299/EEC; - 26-
( I)  "power  of cont ro I"  means  the  reI at I  onsh I  p  between  a'· parent  undertakIng 
and  a  subsidiary,  as  defined  In  Articles 1  and  2  of· Directive 
83/349/EEC,  or  a  similar  relationship  between  any  natural  or  legal 
person  and  an  undertaking; 
(m)  "group  of  connected  clients"  means  two  or  more  persons,  whether 
natural  or  legal,  who,  until  proven  otherwise,  constitute  a  single 
risk because: 
(I)  either  one  of  them  holds,  directly  or  ·Indirectly,  power  of 
control  over  the other or  others, or 
( 1.1)  they  are  so  Interconnected  that,  If  one  of· .  them  were·  to 
experience  financial  problems,  the other  or  all  of  them  would  be 
likely  to  encounter  repayment  difficulties.  such 
Interconnections  to  be  taken  Into  consideration  Include  In 
particular: 
common  ownership; 
common  directors; 
cross guarantees; 
dIrect  commercIa I  Interdependence .  whIch.  cannot .  be 
substituted  In  the short  term. - 27  -
Article 2 
Scope 
Subject  to  paragraph  2,  this  Directive  shall  apply  to  credit  Institutions 
which  have  obtained  the  authorization  referred  to  In  Article 3  of 
Directive 77/780/EEC. 
However,  Member  States need  not  apply  this Directive  to: 
(a)  credit  Institutions  I lsted  In  Article 2(2)  of  Directive 77/780/EEC; 
(b)  Institutions  In  the  same  Member  State  which,  as  defined  In 
Article 2(4)(a)  of  Directive 77/780/EEC,  are  affll lated  to  a  central 
body  In  that  Member  State.  In  that  case.  without  prejudice  to  the 
application  of  this  Directive  to  the  central  body,  the  whole  -
constituted by  the central  body  and  Its affll lated  Institutions- must 
be·  the subject  of  global  supervision with  regard  to  large exposures. - 28  -
Article 3 
Reporting of  large exposures 
1.  A  report  of  every  large  exposure  within  the  meaning  of  paragraph  2 
shal I  be  made  by  the  credit  Institution  to  the  competent  authorities. 
Member  States  shall  provide  that  this  reporting  Is  carried  out  at 
their discretion,  In  accordance  with one  of  the  following  two  methods: 
notification of  all  large  exposures  at  least  once  a  year,  backed 
up  by  communication  during  the  year  of  any  modifications  to  the 
annual  notification; 
notification of all  large exposures at  least  f~ur  times  a  year. 
2.  An  exposure of  a  credit  Institution  to a  client  or  group  of  connected 
c 1 1  ents  1  s  cons 1  de red  to  be  a  "1 arge  exposure"  where  Its  va I  ue  Is 
equal  to or  exceeds  10%  of  own  funds. - 29  -
Article 4 
Limits on  large exposures 
1.  Credit  Institutions  may  not  Incur  an  exposure  to  a  c! lent  or  group  of 
connected  c! Ients where  Its value  exceeds  25%  of  own  funds. 
2.  Where  that  client  or  group  of  connected  clients·  Is  the  parent 
undertaking  of  the  credit  Institution and/or  one  or  more  subsidiaries 
of  that parent  undertaking,  the percentage provided  for  In  paragraph  1 
shall  be  reduced  to  20%. 
3.  Credit  Institutions  may  not  Incur  large  exposures  which,  In  the 
aggregate,  exceed  800%  of  own  funds. 
4.  Member  States may  Impose  more  stringent  rules  than  those  laid  down  In 
paragraphs  1,  2  and  3. 
5.  The  limits  referred  to  In  paragraphs  1,  2  and  3  shal I  be  observed  at 
all  times  by  the  credit  Institution.  They  may  be  exceeded  only  In 
exceptional  circumstances  and,  In  such  cases,  the  competent 
authorities  shall  fix  a  deadline  within  which  the  credit  Institution 
must  regularize  Its situation. 
6.  Member  States  may  fully  or  partially  exempt  from  the  application  of 
paragraph  2  exposures  Incurred  by  the  credit  Institution  to  a 
financial  holding  company  which  Is  Its parent  undertaking and  to other 
subsidiaries of  that  financial  holding  company,  provided  that: 
a)  the  financial  holding  company  Is  Included  In  the supervision on  a 
consolidated  basis  of  the  credit  Institution  exercised  In 
accordance  wIth  Dl rect 1  ve  .. ..  (supervIsIon  on  a  conso II dated 
basis); -· 30-
b)  those  other  su,bsldlarles  are  credit  Institutions.  financial 
Institutions or undertakings providing ancillary banking  services 
and  are  Included  In  the  consolidated  supervision  of  the  credit 
Institution  exercised  In  accordance  with  Directive  ..•••. 
(superv Is  Jon  on  a  conso  1·1 dated  bas Is). 
7.  Member  States  may  fully  or  partially  exempt  from  the  application  of 
·paragraphs  1,  2  and  3  exposures  Incurred by  the  credit  Institution to: 
a)·  its parent  undertaking.  provided  that  the  parent  undertaking  Is  a 
credit  Institution subject  to supervision on  a  consolidated  basis 
exercIsed  In  accordance  wIth  DIrectIve  • • • •  (superv Is  Jon  on  a 
consolidated  basis)  or· to  equivalent  standards  In  force  In  a 
third country; 
b)  subsidiaries,  provided  that  those  subsidiaries  are  credit 
I nst I tut Ions,  f I nancla I  I nst I tut  Ions  or  undertakings  provld I ng 
ancillary  banking  services  and  are  Included  In  the  consolidated 
supervision  of  the  credit  Institution  exercised  In  accordance 
with Directive  •.••  (super·vlslon onra  consolidated basis). 
8.  Member  States  may  fully  or  partially  exempt  the  following  exposures 
from  the  appl lcatlon of  paragraphs  1,  2  and  3: 
· a)  asset  I terns  const I tut Jng· cIa lms  on  Zone  A ·centra I  governments  and 
central  banks; 
b)  asset  Items  constituting claims  on  the  European  Commun_ltles; 
c)  asset  Items  constituting  claims  carrying  the  expl lclt guarantees 
of  Zone  A  central  governments  and  central  banks  or  of  the 
European  Communities; - 31  -
d)  other  exposures attributable to, or  guaranteed  by,  Zone  A central 
governments  and  central  banks  or  the  European  Communities; 
e)  asset  Items  which  constitute claims on  Zone  B central  governments 
and  central  banks,  and  which  are  denominated  and  funded  In  the 
national  currencies of  the  borrowers; 
f)  asset  Items  secured,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  competent 
authorities,  by  collateral  In  the  form  of  zone  A  central 
government  or  central  bank  securities or securities  Issued  by  the 
European  Communities; 
g)  asset  Items  secured,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  competent 
authorItIes,  by  co II atera I  In  the  form  of  cash  deposIts  pI aced 
with  the  lending  Institution  or  with  a  credit  Institution  which 
Is  the  parent  undertaking of  the  lending  Institution; 
h)  asset  Items  secured,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  competent 
authorities,  by  collateral  In  the  form  of  certificates  of 
deposits  Issued  by  and  lodged  with  the  lending  Institution; 
I)  asset  Items  constituting  claims  and  other  exposures  on  credit 
institutions,  with  a  maturity  of  one  year  or  less,  but  not 
constituting  such  Institutions'  own  funds  as  defined  In 
Directive 89/299/EEC; 
J)  bi lis· of  trade  and  other  bills,  with  a  maturity  of  one  year  or 
less,  bearing  the  signature  of  another  credit  Institution  and 
accepted  for  refinancing  by  a  central  bank; 
k)  bonds  defined  In  Article  22(4)  of  Councl I  Directive 85/611/EEcl; 
1  OJ  No  L 375,  31.12.1985,  p.  3. - 32  -
I)  asset  Items  constituting  claims  on  regional  or  central  credit 
Institutions with  which  the  lending  Institution  Is  associated  as 
part  of  a  network  by  virtue of  legal  or  statutory provisions  and 
which  are  responsible,  In  accordance  with  those  provisions,  for 
cash clearing operations within  the  network. 
9.  Member  States may,  for  the  purposes of  paragraphs  1,  2 ·and  3,  apply  a 
we lght lng  of  20%  to  asset  Items  const I tut lng  cIa lms  on  reg lona I  and 
local  authorities  In  the  Member  States  and  to other  exposures  to such 
authorities or  guaranteed  by  them;  however,  subject  to  the  conditions 
laid  down  In  Article 7  of  Directive 89/647/EEC,  Member  States  may 
reduce  this rate  to  ox  . 
10.  Where  an  exposure  to  a  client  Is  guaranteed,  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  competent  authorities.  by  a  third  party,  Member  States  may  deem 
the  exposure  to  have  been  Incurred  to that  third  party  and  not  to  the 
client. - 33-
Article 5 
Supervision on  a  consolidated or unconsolidated basis 
1.  If  the  credit  Institution  Is  neither  a  parent  undertaking  nor  a 
subsidiary,  compliance  with  the obligations set out  In  Articles 3  and 
4 shall  be  supervised on  an  unconsolidated basis. 
2.  If  the credit  Institution  Is  a  parent  undertaking,  compl lance  with  the 
obligations  set~ out  In  Articles 3  and  4  shall  be  supervised  on  a 
consolidated  basis  In  accordance  with  Directive  ••...  (supervision  on 
a  consolidated basis). 
3.  The  competent  authorities  responsible  for  authorizing  and  supervising 
a  credit  Institution  which  Is  a  parent  undertaking  may  also  require 
the  credit  Institution,  together  with  any  of  Its subsidiaries subJect 
to  authorization  and  supervision  by  them,  to  comply  with  the 
obligations  set  out  In  Articles 3  and  4  on  a  subconsolldated  or 
unconsolidated  basis.  Where  such  monitoring  of  the  satisfactory 
allocation of  risks  within  a  banking  group  Is  not  carried out,  other 
measures  shall  be  taken  to that  end. 
4.  Where  the  subsidiary  of  a  parent  undertaking  which  Is  a  credit 
Institution has  been  authorized  In  another  Member  State,  the  competent 
authorities  which  granted  that  authorization  shal I  require  compl lance 
with  the obligations set  out  In  Articles 3  and  4  on  an  unconsolidated 
basis or,  If appropriate,  subconsol !dated. - 34  -
5.  Notwithstanding  paragraph  4,  the competent  authorities  responsible  for 
authorizing  the subsidiary of a,parent  undertaking situated  In  another 
Member  State  may,  by  .way  of  a  bi-lateral  ·agreement,  delegate 
re~ponslbllity for  supervising compliance  with  the obligations set out 
In  Articles 3  and  4  to  the  competent  authorities which  have  authortzed 
and  which  supervise  the  parent· undertaking.  The  Commission. and  the 
BankIng  AdvIsory  CommIttee  sha I I  be  kept  Informed  of  the  content  of 
such  agreements. 
.t., - 35-
Article 6 
Transitional  provisions relating to exposures 
In  excess of  the  I lml ts 
1.  Where,  at  the  time  of  the  publ Jcatlon  of  this  Directive  In  the 
Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities,  a  credit  Institution has 
already  Incurred  an  exposure  or  exposures  exceeding  either  the  large 
exposure  limit  or  the  aggregate  large  exposure  limits,  as  referred  to 
In  Article 4,  the  competent  authorities  shal I  reQuire  the  credit 
Institution  to  take  steps  to  have  the  exposure  or  exposures  of  the 
credit  Institutions concerned  brought  Into  line with  the provisions of 
this Directive. 
2.  The  process  of  havIng  the  exposure  or  exposures  brought . Into  I I  ne 
shall  be  devised,  adopted,  Implemented  and  completed  within  the  period 
deemed  by  the  competent  authorities  to  be  consistent  with  the 
principle of sound  administration and  fair  competition.  The  competent 
authorities  shal I  Inform  the  Commission  and  the  Banking  Advisory 
·Committee  of  the schedule  for  the general  process  adopted. 
3.  Credit  Institutions may  only  take  advantage of  the  period  spe~lfled  In 
paragraph  2  to  the  extent  that  It  does  not  take  any  measure  whIch 
would  cause  the  exposures  to  exceed  the  level  existing at  the  date of 
the  pub! lcatlon  of  the  Directive  In  the  Official  Journal  of. the 
European  Communftles. 
4.  The  period  appl !cable  under  paragraph  2  may  not  exceed  five  years  as 
from  1  January  1993.  However,  loans  with  a  longer  maturity  for  which 
the  lending  credit  Institution  Is  bound  to  respect  the  contractual 
terms,  may  be  continued until  their maturity. - 36 -
5.  For  a  period  not  exceeding  five  years  starting  from  1  January  1993, 
Member  States  may  Increase  the  I lmlt  laid  down  In  Article 4(1)  to  40% 
In  the  case  of  credit  Institutions  belonging  to  the  particular 
categories  referred  to  In  Article 4(2)  of  Directive  89/646/EEC.  In 
such .cases,  the  period  referred  to  In  paragraph  4  shall  be. reduced  to 
three years  and  shall  commence  on  expiry of  the  period  referred  to  In 
this  paragraph.  The  Member  States  concerned  shall  notify  the 
Commission  and  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee  of  the  reasons  which 
have  led  them  to  make  use  of  this  option  and  of  the  steps  they  have 
taken  to  bring  the  excess  exposures  Into  line  with  the  limits  laid 
down. - 37  -
Article 7 
SUbsequent  amendments 
1.  Technical  amendments  to  the  following  points  shall  be  adopted  In 
accordance with  the  procedure set out  In  paragraph  2: 
adaptation  of  definitions  to  take  account  of  developments  on 
financial  markets; 
c I  ar If I  cat Jon  of  dof In It Ions  to  ensure  unIform  app II cat ion  of 
this Directive; 
alignment  of  the  terminology  and  of  the  wording  of  the 
definitions  on  those  contained  In  subsequent  Instruments 
concerning credit  Institutions and  related matters; 
the  frequency  referred to  In  Article 3(1); 
clarification  or  extension  of  tho  exemptions  provided  for  In 
Article 4(5)  to  (9); 
the  period  referred to  In  Article 6(4). 
2.  The  Commission  shall  be  assisted  by  tho  committee  provided  for  In  the 
first  subparagraph of Article 22(2)  of  Directive 89/646/EEC. •.. 
'> 
- 38  -
The  representative of  the  Commission  shall  submit  to  the  committee  a  draft 
of  the  measures  to  be  taken.  The  commIttee  sha I I  de I I  ver  Its  opInIon  on 
the  draft  within  a  time  limit  which  the  chairman  may  lay  down  according  to 
the  urgency  of  the matter.  The  opinion shall  be  delivered  by  the  maJority 
laid  down  In  Article  148(2)  of  the  Treaty  In  the  case  of  decisions  which 
the  council  Is  required  to  adopt  on  a  proposal  from  the ·commission.  The 
votes  of  the  representatives  of  the  Member  States  within  the  committee 
shall  be  weighted  In  the  mannner  set  out  In  that  Article.  The  chairman 
sha I I  not  vote. 
The  Commission  shal I  adopt  the measures  envisaged  If  they are  In  accordance 
with  the opinion of  the committee. 
If  the. measures  envisaged  are  not  In  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the 
committee,  or  If  no  opinion  Is  delivered,  the  Co!J1111lsslon  shall,  without 
de I  ay,  submIt  to  the  Counc I I  a  proposa I  reI at I  ng  . to  the  measures  to  be 
taken.  The  Council  shal I  act  by  a  qualified majority. 
If,  on  the expiry of  three months  from  the date of referral  to  the Councl I, 
the  Council  has  not  acted,  the  proposed  measures ·shall  be  adopted  by  the 
Commission • - 39-
Article 8 
Final  provisions 
1.  Member  States  shall  bring  Into  force  the  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative  provisions  necessary  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of 
this  Dlrectlv.e  on  1  January  1993.  They  shall  forthwith  Inform  the 
COmmission  thereof. 
When  Member  States  adopt  these  provisions.  these  shal I  contain  a 
reference  to  this Directive or  shall  be  accompanied  by  such  reference 
at  the  time  of  their  official  publication.  The  procedure  for  such 
reference shall  be  adopted  by  Member  States. 
2.  Meinber  States  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  texts  of  the 
main  provisions of national  law  which  they adopt  In  the  field governed 
by  this Directive. - 40  -
Article 9 
This  Directive  Is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  For  the counc I I 
The  President - 41  -
FINANCIAL  STATEMENT 
The  propos  a I  w  I I I  not  ent  a I I  any  costs  for  the  European  CommunI t I es' 
budget. - 42  -
CQMPETIT!VENESS  AND  EMPLOYMENT  IMPACT  STATEMENT 
I.  What  Is  the main  reason  for  Introducing  the measure? 
The  main  reason  for  Introducing  the measure  Is  to  Improve  and  reinforce  the· 
supervision  of  credit  institutions  in  the.  Community  as  regards  risk 
concentration. 
I I.  Features of  the  businesses  In  auestlon 
The  proposal  concerns  credit  Institutions,  I.e.  a  regulated  category  of 
enterprises. 
Given  the  minimum  Initial  capital  and  own  funds  amounts  laid  down  In 
Articles 4  and  10  of  Directive 89/646/EEC,  It  Is  doubtful  whether  there are 
many  SMEs  among  the credit  Institutions concerned. 
There  Is  no  regional  concentration. 
111.  What  direct obligations does  this measure  !moose  on  businesses? 
The  proposal  Imposes  on  the  enterprises  concerned,  namely  credit. 
institutions,  the  obligation  to  report  their  large  exposures  to  the 
competent  authorities  and  to  I lmlt  those  large  exposures  to  a  given 
proportion  of  their  own  funds  (25%  for  an  Individual  exposure,  800%  for 
their  aggregate  large exposures). 
IV.  What  Indirect  obligations  are  local  author.itles  likely  to  !moose  on 
businesses? 
No  obi lgatlons  are  I ilcely  to  be  imposed  by  local  authorities  on  the 
businesses concerned. - 43  -
V.  Are  there  any  special  measures  In  respect  of  S~? 
The  proposal  seeks  to  Improve  the  supervision  of  a  regulated  category  of 
enterprise  (credit  Institutions);  It  does  not  therefore  Involve  SMEs  In 
any  way.  Furthermore,  as  the  proposal  Is  designed  to  limit  the  large 
exposures  of  credIt  I  nst I tut Ions,  It  Is  un II ke I  y  that  It  wll I  have  the 
effect of  limiting  the  exposures  Incurred  by  credit  Institutions to SMEs. 
VI.  What  Is  the  I lkely effect on: 
(a)  the  competitiveness of  businesses? 
(b)  employment? 
(a)  As  the  proposal  Is  designed  to  Introduce  fuller  supervision  of  the 
activities  of  credit  Institutions,  the  danger  of  such  Institutions 
fall lng  should  be  reduced,  which  can  have  only  a  beneficial  Impact  on 
theIr  performance  and  on  the  stab II  I  ty  of  economIc  and  f I  nanc 1  a 1 
activity  In  general. 
(b)  No  effect on  employment  Is  anticipated. 
VII.  Have  emoloyers•  and  employees·  representatives  been  consulted?  What 
are  their  views? 
Employees•  representatives  were  Informed  of  the  Commission's  Intention  to 
draw  up  this proposal,  which  wl  II  have  no  Impact  on  their  situation. 
As  far  as  the  business  sector  Is  concerned,  Informal  consultations  have 
been  held  with  the  Banking  Federation  of  the  European  Community,  the 
Savings  Banks  Group  of  the  European  Economic  Community,  the  Association of 
Cooperative  Banks  of  the  EC  and  the  European  Community  Mortgage  Federation. 
These  trade  associ at Ions  generally  accept  the  pr lnclple  of  legis I  at lon 
governing  large  exposures. EN 
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